The semantics of the independence friendly logic of Hintikka and Sandu is usually de ned via a game of imperfect information. We give a de nition in terms of a game of perfect information. We also give an Ehrenfeucht-Fra ss e game adequate for this logic and use it to de ne a Distributive Normal Form for independence friendly logic.
Introduction
We consider a logic IF which is the closure of atomic and negated atomic formulas of rst order logic under the operations (1)^;
(2) _=v i 1 : : : v i k ; (3) 8; (4) 9v n =v i 1 : : :v i k ; where n 6 2 fi 1 ; : : :i k g. This is, mutatis mutandis, the independence friendly logic of Hintikka and Sandu 4] game of imperfect information. Hodges 5] gives an equivalent inductive truth de nition a'la Tarski, which actually makes the semantics compositional. Caicedo and Krynicki 1] use a variation of Hodges' truth-de nition and prove a Prenex Normal Form Theorem.
For rst order logic it is customary to de ne truth in terms of the concept of a sequence satisfying a formula in a structure. However, here we have to deal with sequences in which some elements are independent of some others. But it does not make sense to speak about independence of elements in a single sequence. For example, we may have the sequence 12 32 51 for interpreting the variables v 0 ; v 1 and v 2 . It does not make sense to say that 51 is independent of 12. But if we have a set of sequences, such as 12 32 51 17 32 51 3 32 51 10 46 58 2 46 58 17 46 58 19 46 58 there is a clear sense in which the third elements 51 and 58 are independent of the rst elements of the sequences. This interpretation of independence is an essential feature of the semantics given by Hodges ( 5, 6] ). The treatment of Caicedo and Krynicki is also based on sets of sequences.
Thus we de ne the concept of a set X of sequences satisfying a formula . For ordinary rst order formulas this is equivalent to saying that every individual sequence in the set X satis es . We show that by de ning the basic concepts of semantics systematically in this higher order setting, we get for IF not only a compositional Tarski-style semantics as in Hodges 6 ], but also a game-theoretic semantics of perfect information, and an EhrenfeuchtFra ss e game. The Ehrenfeucht-Fra ss e game is likewise a game of perfect information. The new games are all determined.
The Ehrenfeucht-Fra ss e game is used in Section 5 to analyse IF in terms of the so called Distributive Normal Form, introduced for rst order logic by Hintikka 3] . This is a normal form obtained by pushing quanti ers of a formula in a sense as deep as possible. So it is a kind of opposite for the Prenex Normal Form. (2) A j = X ^ () (A j = X and A j = X ) (3) A j = X _=v i 1 : : : v i k () (9F : X ! 2)(A j = F ?1 (f0g) and A j = F ?1 (f1g) and F is fi 1 ; :::; i k g-uniform ) (4) A j = X 8v n () A j = X A;n] (5) A j = X 9=v i 1 : : : v i k () (9F : X ! A)(A j = X F;n] and F is fi 1 ; :::; i k g-uniform )
For sentences we de ne
The logical consequence j = is de ned to mean 8A8X(A j = X ) A j = X ) and logical equivalence of and is de ned to mean that both j = and j = . Example 2 Let be the formula 9v 1 =v 0 (v 0 = v 1 ). Then _ 6 j = , but j = . Thus _ and are not logically equivalent.
The following lemma is well-known, but we give a proof to illustrate the truth-de nition:
Lemma 3 Suppose A is a set and R A 4 . We prove that the following conditions are equivalent: (1) We shall next give the above semantics in terms of a semantic game. This game seems to be new. There are two players called I and II. A position in the game is a pair p = ( ; X), where is a formula, called the formula of the position, X 2 S(A W ), and the free variables of are among v n , n 2 W. In the beginning, the position is ( ; f;g).
The above game is a game of perfect information: the strategies of both players are allowed to depend on the whole sequence of previous positions. where R 1 ; :::; R n are new predicate symbols and is rst order ( 7] ). Conversely, every 1 1 -sentence of second order logic is equivalent to a sentence of IF ( 7] ). A sentence of IF has a negation if and only if it is rst order de nable ( 7] This is also a game of perfect information and the concept of winning strategy is de ned as usual. The game is determined by the Gale-Stewart theorem ( 2] ). (1) Player II has a winning strategy in the game EF n (A; B). (2) A > n IF B. Proof. If n 2 !; W !; f 2 A n and : n ! W is a bijection, let (f) 2 A W such that (f)(i) = f( (i)) for i = 0; :::; n ? 1. If X A n , let X be the set of (f) with f 2 X. We prove the equivalence of the following two statements: Proof. Suppose (2) holds. Let A =^f 2 Fml n ; : A j = g^^f: 2 Fml n ; : A 6 j = g; where the conjunction is made nite. Let be the ( nite) disjunction of all A , where A 2 K. We show that K is the class of models of . If A 2 K, then A j = A , whence A j = . On the other hand, suppose A j = B for some B 2 K. Now B n A, for if B j = and 2 Fml n ; , then is one of the conjuncts of B , whence A j = . On the other hand, if B 6 j = , then : is one of the conjuncts of B , whence A 6 j = . As K is closed under n , we have A 2 K.
Q.E.D.
Distributive normal forms
De nition 17 Suppose A is a model, X A m and n is a natural number.
We de ne the constituent n A;X as follows: which every (a 0 ; :::; a n?1 ) 2 X satis es in A, F 1 and V 1 range over all F 1 : X ! 2 and V 1 f0;:::;n ? 1g for which F 1 is V 1 -uniform, and F 2 and V 2 range over all F 2 : X ! A and V 2 f0;:::;n?1g for which F 2 is V 2 -uniform. Proposition 20 Suppose A is a model, X A l and n is a natural number.
Then the following are equivalent:
(1) n A;X is rst order de nable.
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(2) n A;X is m-maximal for some m. Proof. Q.E.D.
The following result shows that maximality fails for non-rst order constitutents in a particularly strong way.
Proposition 21 There are models A and B such that for all natural numbers n:
(1) f n A ; n B g is consistent (2) n A 6 j = ; of the empty vocabulary which says that the universe has size at most 2
100
. So the relatively short sentence is rst order de nable, but neither nor its negation has a short rst order de nition, in fact none of quanti er-rank 2 100 .
